Damned if they do, damned if they don’t…
The Jaguar rebranding events last week have certainly succeeded in getting the Jaguar name into many headlines even as they stop production of all models so you can no longer buy a new Jaguar. There's been a huge amount of comment, mainly negative, on social media and the general press. I'm sure that my comments will overlap with many of the views already expressed, but I think that you need to look at the options that JLR faced before damning the approach.
Over the years I've owned or run as a company car four Jaguars as well as working for them as a consultant at various stages in my career. That might indicate a degree of bias, but also means that I've had the opportunity to see things from the inside, not just on the basis of an armchair commentator. Going back to the days when Jaguar became part of Ford’s Premier Automotive Group under the leadership of Wolfgang Reitzle, there was a sustained effort to replicate the success of the big three German premium brands – Audi, BMW and Mercedes. The influx of German executives was on such a scale that some people referred to JLR as the fourth German premium brand. With ICDP consumer research showing that new car buyers quite quickly come down to a shortlist of three brands or less, being in fourth position is an uncomfortable place to be unless you have some edge that is truly distinctive. Arguably, Porsche has that distinction, as does Jaguar sister brand Land Rover, but Jaguar itself and other aspiring premium brands such as Lexus have struggled to make major inroads despite having excellent product.
The result of this was that Jaguar suffered, never achieving the volumes they targeted for any of the products even when they got strongly positive reviews in the automotive consumer press. I suspect that none of them contributed positively to the overall JLR profitability after accounting for the investment and marketing support costs. No rational investor will sustain a loss-making business indefinitely, so clearly some action was needed.
At one point I ran an X300 model XJR. This was a totally new product with an aluminium body, air suspension and 400 horsepower engine. I have fond memories of a cross-country trip with my friend and colleague, the late Martin Leach, who was in his Ferrari 430 with me leading as I had the advantage of satnav. (How times have changed on that one!). After a fun drive he commented on how well the XJR went and that many cars would have ended up in a field rather than act as a pacesetter for the Ferrari. But it looked like a facelift of the previous generation model. When I asked why such a huge technological change had not been signalled with a new look, I was told that a more radical option had been put to the Ford board but was rejected because it would alienate the existing customer base.
And that really is the essence of the current debate with the Jaguar re-branding. The existing customer base is not big enough to support the product line-up that we have seen over the last 20 years at the price points that have been achievable. Jaguar needs to break out from that if it is to survive in some form in the future. It may be that the new products will not appeal to the traditional base, including myself. The repositioning will certainly result in the products being unaffordable for many who have had Jaguars in the past, and it seems that the products will be competing more against top end Porsche Taycan and the forthcoming small pure electric Bentley, than they will against the 3-series or an E-Class.
Given that repositioning and dropping some familiar icons like the ‘leaper’, the brand is effectively starting from scratch. That to me is the biggest challenge. Will the fact that the Jaguar name itself is familiar give people who are new to the brand some greater level of interest or confidence than you would have in a totally unfamiliar new brand such as for example Hongqi from China? It is interesting when you consider the Chinese brands, that Hongqi launched two new models at the Paris Show (penned by an ex-JLR designer) which could very easily have been Audis. They are clearly hoping that a more conventional approach than they had with their more radical E-HS9 model will win them the success in Europe that they hope for. In parallel, one factor that has probably helped MG to achieve its level of success in Europe to date is the fact that the brand name is familiar, even if all the products until the recently launched Cyberster have been totally different to traditional MGs.
Jaguar is not unique in being in this position. Stellantis have publicly recognised the challenges they face with the Alfa Romeo and Maserati brands. In both cases the strategy to date has been to navigate by looking in the rearview mirror – trying to build on past glories but hoping that this time they will find a demand for the products that makes them financially viable. Carlos Tavares is on record as saying that all the family brands have a limited amount of time in order to demonstrate that they can be profitable. If that doesn’t happen, will we see another radical rebranding in the same mould as Jaguar? Time will tell – next week we will see the Jaguar concept that reflects the first of the new models due to launch in 2026. It will undoubtedly be deliberately provocative – but will it trigger a flurry of deposits and interest from real prospects that suggests the transition will be successful? If that’s the case, then the pressure will be on to deliver the product that converts that interest into profitable revenue.